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The Mexican Cartel Debate: 
As Viewed Through Five Divergent Fields of 
Security Studies 
 
Robert J. Bunker 
 
The Mexican cartel debate is becoming increasingly more important to U.S. national security, 
however, it is also becoming ever more confused, heated, and at times downright nasty, with 
little agreement about what is taking place in Mexico or in other regions of the Americas, such as 
Guatemala, Honduras, and even this side of the U.S. border. To shed some light on this critical 
debate—a debate we need to have now and not later— it is the contention of this author that, 
since the Mexican cartel phenomena is being looked at by scholars from divergent fields of 
security studies and since each field of study brings with it its own key assumptions and 
concerns, preferred responses, terminology, works, and authors, those analyzing the problem are 
often talking at cross-purposes which is unproductive.  Additionally, dissention among those 
within each individual field of study about the threat the cartels represent—the divergences 
among those who study insurgencies as but one important example— adds another layer of 
confusion to this debate. 
 
It can be argued that an ordinal threat continuum exists, differentiated by field of security study, 
of the danger that cartels represent to the Mexican state and, in turn, those states bordering it. 
Taken together, these threat assessments are helping to actively influence U.S. public and 
governmental perceptions of the conflict now taking place in Mexico and, ultimately, help shape 
U.S. policy. While it is accepted that other major factors and biases are in play—U.S. federal and 
state governments and administrations, political parties and action committees, citizens groups, 
and the ideological leanings of the individual media outlets all attempt to influence this debate—
academics and professionals aligned within recognized fields of security studies have a 
disproportionate impact due to their propensity to actively publish as well as get their messages 
out via other media.  The debate benefits from each field‟s unique insights, unfortunately, these 
come with the baggage of having its own biases and their own interests at heart.  Accordingly, 
some attempt will be made to mitigate the deleterious effects of this fact while seeking potential 
areas for cooperation between the fields. 
 
Divergent Fields of Security Studies 
 
Five primary fields of security studies are presently engaged, to one extent or another, in 
research and publication on the Mexican cartel phenomena and on the threat that this phenomena 
poses to that country, to the United States, and to other Western Hemispheric nations. Each field 
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of security study will be summarized and its major assumptions, concerns, and authors 
highlighted:
1
  
 
 Gang Studies: These studies fall primarily under the disciplines of sociology and criminal 
justice. Law enforcement practitioners in gang units, such as Wes McBride (Sgt. LASD, 
Ret), and university academics have long dominated this field. This field focuses on 
generic street and drug gangs, prison gangs, geographically focused (e.g. New York, 
Chicago, Los Angeles) gangs, specialized ethnic (e.g. Hispanic, African American) gangs 
and gender (female) gangs. Gangs with more organized structures—such as Asian and 
Outlaw Motorcycle— also fall into this field with some overlap into organized crime 
studies.  The basic assumption is that street, drug, and prison gangs engage in „low 
intensity crime‟ activities and therefore they are a local law enforcement problem— 
though regional and national gang investigators associations have emerged for 
information sharing and coordination purposes due to the spread of these groups 
throughout the United States.  Key authors in this field include the late Frederic Thrasher 
along with present day authors Malcolm Klein, George Knox, William Dunn, and John 
Hagedorn. [It must be noted that Hagedorn has recently rethought the usefulness of 
studies derived from traditional criminology—parting ways with the statement “De 
mortuis nil nisi bonum” (Speak no ill of the dead)2— and is branching out into terrorism 
and insurgency research due to the increasing global nature of „armed young men‟ and 
the growing influence of criminal networks.]  
 
 Organized Crime Studies: This field, which covers both domestic and transnational (or 
global) organized crime, draws normally upon the disciplines of political science, history, 
and criminal justice. Organized criminal organizations and illicit economies are the center 
focus of these studies. It should be pointed out that the Mexican cartels are still drawing 
the bulk of their resources presently from illicit narcotics sales, but have also branched 
out into numerous other illicit endeavors including human trafficking, kidnapping, and 
street taxation. The basic assumption of this field is that organized crime entities seek to 
establish a parasitic (and symbiotic) relationship with their host state(s) and simply obtain 
freedom of actions for their illicit activities. Such criminal entities are viewed as solely 
money making endeavors, are not politicized, and have no intention of creating their own 
shadow political structures or taking over the reigns of governance. These studies view 
organized crime as the purview of law enforcement with specialized units (i.e. FBI and 
DEA task forces) required to dismantle the more sophisticated and dangerous criminal 
organizations. The conflict environment is said to be that of crime or organized crime 
with the extreme operational environment now found in Mexico being labeled as that of 
„high intensity crime‟. Key authors in this field include Phil Williams, Bruce Bagley, 
George Grayson, and Tony Rafael. 
 
 Terrorism Studies: This field of studies emerged out of the late 1960s—as urban guerillas 
became politically motivated terrorists— with initial terrorism courses taught in the mid-
to-late 1970s in political science and international relations departments. This field has 
had its assumptions shift from limited levels of violence utilized and the use of 
kidnappings as theater plays; hence “terrorists want lots of people watching— not dead”3 
to religiously motivated terrorists who seek to engage in killing on a mass scale. The 
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basic assumption is that terrorists, both politically and religiously motivated, engage in 
destructive attacks that generate „terror‟ (a form of disruptive societal targeting) in order 
to change governmental policies. Further, terrorism is considered a technique that, when 
utilized in a revolutionary or insurgent setting, can help to create a shadow government 
and/or overthrow a government in power. Narco-terrorism would be considered a 
subfield of terrorism studies—though utilizing terror to promote criminal objectives. To 
date, many of the best and brightest terrorism scholars—except for Brian Jenkins who 
possesses insurgency expertise from the Vietnam era—have not made an attempt to 
engage in this area of research as it pertains to the cartels in Mexico. Depending on its 
severity and where it takes place, terrorism can be considered a law enforcement 
problem, a homeland security problem, and/or a military problem. Key authors in this 
field include Brian Jenkins, Stephen Sloan, Bruce Hoffman, David Rapoport, and Marc 
Sageman.  
 
 Insurgency Studies: These studies are politico-military based and undertaken at think 
tanks, in some university departments, and at U.S. military and governmental institutions. 
They are the bread and butter focus of Small Wars Journal and get us into topical areas 
including revolutionary warfare, insurgency, guerrilla warfare, low intensity conflict, 
operations other than war, shadow governmental structures, and a host of other terms for 
this level of conflict and/or techniques. Since terrorism is also common as an insurgency 
technique, some bleed over from this field to terrorism studies exists as do some forays 
into organized crime studies, due to the benefits illicit economies provide to insurgents 
(for example, we might ask where the Taliban would be without its illicit narcotics 
income). This field predates Mao Zedong‟s works of the late 1930s and has been 
developing for over a half-century with key interest during the Vietnam era. The field is 
especially vibrant now with American involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan-Pakistan. 
Assumptions and concerns focus on political change and revolution, that is, how groups 
out of power in a country seize control of a government by indirect and irregular means 
not conventional military conquest.   The latter may, however, be considered the final 
phase of revolutionary warfare so clearly the techniques used vary widely. Insurgency 
itself, if allowed to gain strength, is viewed as a national security threat to a state. This 
field of study is undergoing its own internal debate concerning the primacy of political 
based insurgency vs. broadening the definition of insurgency to include other forms 
derived from religion and/or criminality. The threat posed by the Mexican cartels 
encompasses this internal debate and raises the question as to whether Mexico is or is not 
facing “criminal insurgencies”.4  Key authors in this field include Max Manwaring, 
Graham Turbiville, Jr., T.X. Hammes, Steve Metz, and David Kilcullen. 
 
 Future Warfare Studies: The areas of military and strategic studies, political science, 
international relations, and military history (via trend analysis) have all contributed to the 
study of future warfare. This form of study assumes that „modes of warfare‟ or „coherent 
warfare practices‟ exist and that warfare is continually evolving. Typically, this is 
attributed to the introduction of new forms of technology (such as the stirrup or 
gunpowder), an expansion of the battlespace into new temporal and spatial dimensions 
(such as the domain of cyberspace), or the rise of new military organizational forms (such 
as the legion or modern divisional structure).  Multivariate explanations for the evolution 
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of warfare also readily exist in this field of study. The threat represented by the Mexican 
cartels would therein be considered part of a modal warfare shift. This shift would, at a 
minimum, elevate the threat the Mexican cartels represent to that of a national security 
threat as the cartels would be engaging in a new form of warfare against the Mexican 
state—though a number of scholars would argue such a threat transcends national 
security and represents a threat to the nation-state form itself. Key authors in this field 
include Martin van Creveld, John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Phillip Bobbitt, John 
Robb, and the author of this essay along with his frequent collaborator and „intellectual 
wingman‟ John Sullivan. 
 
Numerous discipline and author omissions certainly exist concerning this security studies 
conceptual schema— country (Mexico) and area (Central and Latin America) and peace studies 
and conflict resolution scholars are not directly considered here. As a result, the important work 
of Roderic Camp (Mexican studies/army specialist), David Shirk (peace studies applied to 
Mexico), and Steven Dudley (Central America specialist), and the contributions of many 
others— including Ed Vulliamy, Hal Brands, Samuel Logan, Malcolm Beith, and David 
Danelo— would seemingly be overlooked. It is the perspective of this author, however, that their 
focuses and assumptions could and would be incorporated into this schema because they will 
weigh in on the Mexican cartel debate via their varying focuses as they fit within these five fields 
of security studies. Hypothetically, for instance, Roderic Camp might analyze the Mexican army 
at the level of organized crime studies—how effective is its policing operations—or just as easily 
analyze it at the terrorism or insurgency studies level and, as a result, measure how effective it is 
in either counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency operations.  
 
Threat Continuum 
 
The threat continuum represented by these five fields of security studies is ordinal in nature and 
begins at the micro level and extends to the macro level (Fig. 1).  
 
Figure 1. Threat Continuum with Worst Case Scenarios for Mexico 
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As applied to Mexico, each field envisions a „worst case scenario‟ that characterizes the severity 
of the threat as it is derived from the parameters of that field of study.
5
 These worst case 
scenarios and governmental threat perceptions, theoretical insights, and other important 
developments are as follows: 
 
 Gang Members/Street & Prison Gangs: The worst case scenario at this level of threat is 
for gangs to control neighborhoods and prisons or drug markets in different sections of 
cities or towns. Operational environments: crime and low intensity crime.  
Virtually no one thinks the threat to Mexico exists solely at this level, although these 
groups are integral allies and/or contractors to the cartels for intelligence, security, drug 
distribution, and enforcement services. From the perspective of 3GEN Gangs theory, 
these groups represent 1
st
 (Turf) and 2
nd
 (Drug) gangs. Increasingly, law enforcement 
agencies from Los Angeles and other U.S. cities are providing gang unit support to 
Mexico and Central American countries concerning this threat. 
 
 Drug Dealers and Enforcers/Drug Trafficking Organizations: The worst case scenario is 
DTOs (or cartels) creating „zones of impunity‟ which provide them with the ability to 
engage in their activities without governmental hindrance. These organizations simply 
seek to make money via illicit means and have no desire to be involved in politics or 
governance. Corruption is utilized, along with violence, to obtain freedom of action for 
their criminal activities. Operational environments: crime, organized crime, and high 
intensity crime.  
 
The Calderon administration has stated that this level accurately reflects the security 
threat facing Mexico. The Mexican cartels are said to represent the forces of organized 
crime and nothing more, even though some hundreds of „zones of impunity‟ are 
recognized to exist and the deployment of military forces to maintain civil order in some 
of the cities in Mexico continues. The DEA and FBI are heavily involved in suppressing 
the various Mexican cartels in the United States (e.g. Operation Deliverance, Operation 
Xcellerator, Project Coronado) and insuring that the corruption coming over the border 
does not deeply penetrate our public law enforcement agencies (e.g. FBI-led Border 
Corruption Task Forces are expanding). These and other U.S. Federal Law Enforcement 
Agencies are also active in Mexico and Central America in responding to Mexican drug 
trafficking organization activities.  
 
 Terrorists/Terrorist Groups: The worst case scenario for this level of threat is cartel use 
of narco-terrorist tactics—bombings and standup assaults, kidnappings, and other forms 
of violence directed at the Mexican public (e.g. the grenade attacks in Morelia, 
Michoacán, in September 2008)— to obtain political concessions from the Mexican 
federal government so that the cartels can freely continue with their illicit activities. 
Cartel weapons of mass destruction (WMD) use potentials have never been contemplated 
and this threat is viewed to exist at the „gun and the bomb‟ level only. Operational 
environments: terrorism and homeland security.  
 
Terrorist tactics are actually being used against other cartels (to eliminate or scare off 
organized crime competitors/secure illicit revenues), against Mexican police and military 
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forces (in a classic insurgency role), and at times against the Mexican public (as a form of 
narco-terrorism). Both Federal Mexican law enforcement and the Mexican military are 
being forced to develop counter-terrorism and force protection capabilities to respond to 
the use of terrorism. Of interest is the January 2011 suggestion by Edgardo Buscaglia, a 
fellow at the Autonomous Technological Institute of Mexico (ITAM), that Los Zetas and 
other cartel groups be designated as terrorists under U.N. statutes.  This suggestion, 
however, will go nowhere with the Calderon administration. From the perspective of the 
U.S. State Department, it may hold some eventual merit since the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)—
Colombian insurgents involved in drug trafficking— are so designated under its Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) designations. 
 
 Insurgents/Insurgent Groups: The worst case scenario is an indirect cartel (criminal) 
takeover of the Mexican government and/or alliance with it by means of the creation of a 
parallel shadow government.  This would imply the installation of a new Mexican 
president and ruling party controlled by, most likely, the Sinaloa Cartel, representing a 
multi-cartel and multi-gang coalition.  Numerous shadow governments at the city and 
town (and possibly even state governor) levels already exist in Mexico. This would be an 
extension of the process of the assassination of local mayors, suppression of the free 
press, and mass corruption of many public officials already taking place.  Operational 
environments: small wars, insurgency, low intensity conflict, and guerilla warfare. 
 
The Obama Administration in September 2010, via Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, 
injected a „trial balloon‟ in the Mexican cartel debate. The conflict in Mexico was said to 
be beginning to appear like the insurgencies that have taken place in Colombia. This was 
immediately met with a strong diplomatic rebuke by the Calderon administration and 
resulted in President Obama personally apologizing for the comparison. Absolutely no 
mention was made of the threat embodied by the Mexican cartels during Obama‟s 
January 2011 State of the Union address, suggesting that this issue, compounded by the 
released Wikileaks diplomatic messages, has made any public statements concerning this 
threat too politically sensitive to be issued. In February 2011, Undersecretary of the 
Army Joseph Westphal speaking at a public forum at a University in Utah said “As all of 
you know, there is a form of insurgency in Mexico with the drug cartels that‟s right on 
our border…This is about, potentially, a takeover of a government by individuals who are 
corrupt.”6 These words received a fierce rebuke by the Calderon administration that 
resulted in Undersecretary Westphal quickly apologizing and withdrawing his public 
statement. At the same time that the “I” word has been mentioned in the public media and 
shot down by the Calderon administration, the U.S. has been quietly providing counter-
insurgency aid and training to Mexican military forces. 
 
 Non-State (Criminal) Soldiers/Criminal Armies:  Threats at this level basically represent 
criminal challengers to the nation-state form that are extremely hostile to traditional states 
such as Mexico and the United States. The worst case scenario is that of the rise of a new 
warmaking entity—one that is network organized—establishing itself in Mexico and 
other nations of the Americas and, as it grows in strength, takes control of transnational 
territories and population centers including that of sovereign governments. Al Qaeda, by 
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the way, would be considered representative of another one of these new and still 
evolving warmaking entities. Operational environments: the blurring of crime and 
war, hybrid war, netwar, post-modern war.  
 
Such a worst case scenario is usually found only in scholarly books and papers, which 
rarely get much attention or readership outside the field, and in governmental and 
military analytical products on future threats, typically not for public disclosure. This 
author can only speak to the former of these worst case scenarios. Martin van Creveld‟s 
The Transformation of War (1991) is the best known work in this regard, especially when 
we remember his prophetic statement—“In the future, war will not be waged by armies 
but by groups whom we today call terrorists, guerrillas, bandits and robbers, but who will 
undoubtedly hit on more formal titles to describe themselves” (p. 197). A sole focus on 
his work alone would take us deep into debates on the merits and detractions of non-
trinitarian warfare, therefore, it must be realized that extensive work has been done in this 
area of security studies by many other authors. Terms associated with this level of threat 
include 3GEN (politicized/mercenary) Gangs, 3
rd
 Phase Cartels, Epochal Change, 
BLACKFOR, Revolution in Political and Military Affairs (RPMA), and „Criminal 
Insurgencies‟ as a component of an RPMA which takes place during periods of Epochal 
Change. Of interest is Guatemalan President Alvaro Colom‟s “remarkable call for a 
unified counternarcotics force that would set aside nationalist rivalries to combine 
soldiers from Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras to retake territory from the 
expanding crime syndicates” in January 2011.7 For Guatemala, which has imposed a 
“state of siege” and martial law in Alta Verapaz province due to Los Zetas and Sinaloan 
cartel invasions, the threat represented by criminal-armies has become a reality. 
 
It would be fair to say that attributes of the Mexican cartels and their network affiliates exist all 
along this threat continuum from the micro to the macro level of concern. Hence, all of these 
fields of security studies should rightfully be involved in analyzing this complex threat to the 
Mexican state. It should also be noted that much of the violence taking place in Mexico is cartel 
network vs. cartel network —these entities and their gang and mercenary allies are fighting over 
lucrative drug plazas and transit routes, new illicit revenue opportunities, influence and control 
over Mexican public officials, and even petty squabbles over perceived slights to one‟s honor.  
This is truly making the conflict taking place in Mexico resemble a free-for-all with ever shifting 
cartel and gang alliances and even different Mexican governmental institutions and pubic 
officials either siding with, or in actuality members of, one cartel or another. 
 
Stove Pipes, Rice Bowls, and Areas of Cooperation 
 
The problem of the narrow compartmentalization of fields (i.e. stove pipes) and the fight for a 
part of limited resources (i.e. rice bowls) as it pertains to debating the threat posed by the 
Mexican cartels, before one even gets to the problem of responding to the violence and 
corruption carried out by these cartels and their affiliates, is nothing new. It was discussed by this 
author in the earlier Narcos Over the Border work as it pertained to the seven trans-operational 
environments involving U.S. engagement with Mexican cartels, mercenaries and Sureños gangs 
in the Americas.
8
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Each discipline represents a cohesive area of study with its own level of concern and focus of 
threat emphasis. For simple threats, such as a specific street gang— like the Hicks gang in El 
Monte, California— the gang studies (in the applied sense, gang suppression) approach utilized 
by local law enforcement is adequate for the task at hand. The same could be said for organized 
crime studies and the New York based mafias—scholars within the field are able to successfully 
analyze them and FBI lead task forces are well suited to contend with such threats.  
 
These traditional organizational structures—combining scholars and more applied professionals 
(e.g. gang cops, FBI agents, and intelligence analysts)—as an extension of the differing fields of 
security studies begin to falter, however, when faced with more complex threats. In this instance, 
the extreme specialization that works so well for focusing on a specific threat—be it gangs, 
organized criminals, terrorists or insurgents— can become a great liability. Members belonging 
to these divergent security fields hold very different viewpoints about what constitutes a threat, 
which threats are more important than others, and how they should be addressed, and may even 
possess extremely different professional cultures. Sometimes these security fields, especially 
within much larger agencies or between academic departments and think tank divisions, come 
into conflict when they compete for finite resources to engage in their activities.  Ultimately, this 
extreme specialization means that wide „informational seams‟ exist between insular, and at times 
competing, fields of security studies. An attempt to get two or more of these fields together to 
contend with a complex threat such as that posed by the Mexican cartels (and their vast network 
of gang and mercenary auxiliaries) likely means that major problems will ensue. These problems 
multiply as more fields are required to contend with a complex threat.  If personnel representing 
fields at opposite ends of the threat continuum are brought together to work on a threat issue—
assuming you can get such differing security professionals together in the first place—then the 
problems may multiply exponentially. 
 
What is clear is that complex post-modern threats—such as those posed by the Mexican cartels 
and, for that matter, Al Qaeda and its affiliate network— do not fit into neat categories and well-
defined security fields. What is needed is for a U.S. governmental „honest broker‟ or supra-
security organization to come into the Mexican cartel debate and leverage the five fields of 
security studies highlighted in this essay into a broader networked effort.  This effort must 
further be tied into issues pertaining to the trans-operational environments involving U.S. 
engagement with Mexican cartels and their affiliates. We can no longer afford the luxury of 
watching numerous fields of study and security response organizations—each with their own 
form of „extreme specialization‟— independently going about their activities in a totally 
uncoordinated manner. Instead, attention should be directed at creating a hemispheric strategy 
for the Americas, possibly even global in scale, to directly challenge the rise of the Mexican 
cartels and their mercenary and gang affiliates along the entire threat continuum highlighted in 
this essay.  
 
Notes 
 
1. Key authors may write and have influence in more than one field of study. They have been 
assigned to the field of security studies which best characterizes their dominant works and 
impact. Note that some of the authors designated may have great impact in their field of studies 
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but at present have not fully weighed in on the Mexican cartel debate. For omissions and errors 
made, I apologize. 
2. John M. Hagedorn, A World of Gangs.” Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 
2008: 134. 
3. This well known refrain is attributed to Brian Jenkins. 
4. Small Wars Journal readers will benefit from this discussion because ultimately many of those 
readers either have an interest in, or actively identify themselves, with the field of insurgency 
(small wars) studies. That field of security studies, like the others, seeks to influence the Mexican 
cartel debate and this author would, among others, argue that the “insurgency” construct, albeit a 
criminal (as in John Sullivan’s ‘criminal insurgencies’ construct) rather than a traditional 
political or revolutionary derived one, represents the most accurate perceptual lens by which to 
understand and respond to this threat—one that is in actuality grand strategic in nature.  
5. Worst case scenarios for each of these fields of security studies may be different than 
projections of alternative futures. See Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan, “Cartel evolution 
revisited: third phase cartel potentials and alternative futures in Mexico.” Robert J. Bunker, ed., 
Narcos Over the Border: Gangs, Cartels and Mercenaries. London: Routledge, 2011: 46-50. 
Another future discussed is that of Mexico becoming a failed-state. For an analysis of state 
disintegration in Mexico see George W. Grayson, Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State? 
New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2010. 
6. Matthew D. LaPlante, “Army Official Suggests U.S. Troops Might be Needed in Mexico.” 
The Salt Lake Tribune. 8 February 2011 (Update). http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/home/51207681-
76/mexico-westphal-army-drug.html.csp# (accessed 9 February 2011). 
7. William Booth and Nick Miroff, “Mexican drug cartels draws Guatemalan army to jungles 
where it fought civil war.” The Washington Post. 9 February 2011. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/09/AR2011020906371.html 
(accessed 10 February 2011). 
8. Robert J. Bunker, “Strategic threat: narcos and narcotics overview.” Robert J. Bunker, ed., 
Narcos Over the Border: Gangs, Cartels and Mercenaries. London: Routledge, 2011: 21-24. 
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unique perspective on each of these fields, their assumptions, concerns, and the major authors 
influencing them. He holds degrees in political science, government, behavioral science, social 
science, anthropology-geography, and history. Past associations have included Futurist in 
Residence, FBI Academy, Quantico, VA; Counter-OPFOR Program Consultant (Staff Member), 
National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center—West, El Segundo, CA; Fellow, 
Institute of Law Warfare, Association of the US Army, Arlington, VA; Lecturer-Adjunct 
Professor, National Security Studies Program, California State University San Bernardino, San 
Bernardino, CA; Instructor, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA; and founding 
member, Los Angeles County Terrorism Early Warning Group. Dr. Bunker has over 200 
publications including short essays, articles, chapters, papers and book length documents. These 
include Non-State Threats and Future Wars (editor); Networks, Terrorism and Global 
Insurgency (editor); Criminal-States and Criminal-Soldiers (editor); Narcos Over the Border 
(editor); and Red Teams and Counter-Terrorism Training (co-author— forthcoming). He has 
provided over 200 briefings, papers, and presentations to US LE, MIL, GOV, and other groups 
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in the US and overseas. He is a frequent Small Wars Journal contributor and can be reached at 
bunker@usc.edu.    
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